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This chapter concerns welfare measurement in economies, where the government raises 
revenue by means of distortionary taxation. A major issue is the treatment of (state-variable) 
public goods in the context of social accounting. Although the marginal value that the 
government attaches to a public good is model-specific (as it depends on the exact nature of 
the underlying decision-problem), the analysis explains how the direct resource cost of 
providing increments to the public good and the marginal cost of public funds can be used to 
measure this marginal value. The first part of the chapter is based on a representative-agent 
growth model with linear taxation, whereas the second part addresses a model with 
heterogeneous agents and nonlinear taxation. The latter model also provides a framework for 
analyzing redistribution in the context of social accounting, and enables me to compare the 
results with those that would follow in a first best resource allocation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Earlier literature on social accounting has typically focused either on first best resource 
allocations, or resource allocations that - for one reason or another - are suboptimal from 
society’s point of view in which case society as a whole has not made an optimal choice given 
its preferences and constraints. A basic message here is that the current value Hamiltonian 
underlying the economic system constitutes an exact welfare measure in utility terms if the 
resource allocation is first best, whereas it does not in general constitute an exact welfare 
measure if the resource allocation is suboptimal.
1 One purpose of the present chapter is to 
address the welfare measurement problem in an economy, where the first best is unattainable 
due to the necessity to raise public revenue by means of distortionary taxes. In such a second 
best economy, the government (or social planner) has made an optimal policy choice, 
although the set of policy instruments might not be flexible enough to implement the first 
best. Another purpose is to address the treatment of public consumption in the context of 
social accounting. I will also briefly consider redistribution, which is another important aspect 
of public policy. 
 
Why are taxation, public consumption and redistribution interesting to analyze in the context 
of welfare measurement and social accounting? First, the public sector plays a crucial role for 
the allocation of resources in all developed countries by providing public services as well as 
by redistributing income among individuals and groups. As a consequence, public expenditure 
is likely to be of considerable importance for well-being, implying that the treatment of such 
expenditures in social accounting is a relevant issue. Second, if the public revenue is raised 
via distortionary taxation, there is an additional social cost associated with public 
expenditures, which ought to be relevant for welfare measurement. On the other hand, if the 
public revenue were raised via lump-sum taxation, there would be no ‘extra’ welfare cost of 
taxation and, therefore, no additional complications for social accounting of raising revenue 
for purposes of public provision and redistribution. 
 
The chapter begins by analyzing the welfare measurement problem implicit in Chamley’s 
(1985) dynamic second best economy, which is an extension of the Ramsey (1927) optimal 
                                                           
1 As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this volume, the basic welfare economic foundation for social accounting in a 
first best economy originates from Weitzman (1976). For an overview of the literature dealing with social 
accounting in imperfect market economies, see Aronsson et al. (2004). 
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growth model in the sense of adding a public sector and assuming that the public revenue is 
raised by a linear, yet time-varying, labor income tax. The analysis carried out in this part of 
the chapter relies largely on Aronsson (1998, 2008), who examined how distortionary taxes 
affect the way in which welfare ought to be measured in a dynamic economy, as well as how 
public goods ought to be treated in social accounting if the public revenue is raised by 
distortionary taxes. A change of assumption I make here is that the public good will be 
assumed to be a state-variable (instead of a conventional flow-variable); an assumption 
motivated by the desire to add realism to the description of the economy.
2  Throughout this 
part of the chapter, I also compare the welfare measurement and valuation procedures of the 
second best economy with those that appear in the first best; the latter being a natural special 
case and, therefore, easy to discuss within the framework of the more general model. The 
final part of the chapter deals with welfare measurement – and, in particular, measurement of 
value of public consumption - in an economy with nonlinear taxation. The underlying 
framework here is the two-type optimal income tax model developed by Stern (1982) and 
Stiglitz (1982)
3 which is, in turn, a simplification of Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal  nonlinear tax 
model with a continuum of ability-types. Such an extension serves two purposes. First, it adds 
realism by relaxing the assumption (in the Chamley model) that the use of disortionary 
taxation is a consequence of restrictions on the set of policy instruments that the government 
is allowed to use; here, its use is, instead, a consequence of asymmetric information between 
the private sector and the government. Second, it allows me to provide a more close 
connection between social accounting and the literature on public good provision, as the 
policy rule for a public good and, as a consequence, the procedure for measuring its social 
value largely depends on the set of tax instruments that the government has at its disposal. 
 
2. A Dynamic Representative Agent Model with Linear Taxation 
 
The model developed in this section is, to a large extent, based on Chamley (1985), which 
implies that the consumption side of the economy is characterized by a representative 
consumer. As a consequence, we disregard any distributional objectives underlying public 
                                                           
2 Typical textbook examples of public goods – or public good like variables – often include measures of 
environmental quality, national infrastructure and national defence; all of which struck me as better described as 
state-variables than conventional flow-variables.   
 
3 See also Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) and Aronsson et al. (2009) for extensions of the two-type optimal income 
tax model to dynamic economies. 
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policy in this section. A multi-consumer economy along with distributional objectives is 




Following the main bulk of literature on social accounting, suppose that the economy is 
populated by a fixed number of identical consumers. Since this fixed number is of no concern 
here, it will be normalized to one. The preferences are described by a time-separable utility 
function. The instantaneous utility function at any time, t, takes the form 
 
  ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ut uct zt Gt =                         (1) 
 
where c is consumption of a privately provided good, z leisure and G consumption of a public 
good. The determination of the public good will be further discussed below. Leisure is 
defined as a (fixed) time endowment, l , less the time spent in market work, l. The function 
u() ⋅  is increasing in each argument and strictly concave. The consumer treats the public good 
as exogenous. 
 
The consumer holds two assets; capital, k , and government bonds, b . These two assets are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes and have the same rate of return. If we define the composite 
asset  b k a + = , the asset accumulation equation can be written as 
 
 () () () ()() () n at rtat w tlt ct =+ −                        (2) 
 
with  0 (0) aa = , where  n w  is the net wage rate and r  the interest rate. The net wage rate is 
defined as  ( ) ( )[1 ( )] n wt w t t τ =− , where w is the gross wage rate and τ  the tax rate
4.  
 
The consumer chooses his/her consumption of the private good, c, and hours of work, l, at 
each instant to maximize the present value of future utility, 
 
                                                           
4 Note that I abstract from capital income taxes in what follows. Since the model already contains one 
distortionary tax, adding another will not affect the principal findings below. See Chamley (1986) for a dynamic 
representative agent model with linear taxes on labor income and capital income.    5
 
0
(0) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
t Uu c t z t G t e d t
θ
∞
− =∫ , 
 
subject to equation (2), the initial condition as well as subject to a so called No Ponzi Game 
(NPG) condition, the purpose of which is to ensure that the present value of the asset is 
nonnegative at the terminal point. The parameter θ  is the utility discount rate (i.e. the 
marginal rate of time preference). By using the first order conditions
5 (() ,() ) () 0 c uc tz t t φ −=  
and ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) 0 zn uc tz t t wt φ −+ = , in which φ  is the marginal utility of wealth in current 
value terms, one can write the consumption and hours as functions of the net wage rate, the 
marginal utility of wealth and the public good, respectively (i.e. so called Frisch demand 
functions) 
 
 () ( () , () , () ) n ct cw t t Gt φ =                         (3) 
 () ( () , () , () ) n lt lw t t Gt φ = .                        (4) 
 
The marginal utility of wealth obeys, in turn, the differential equation 
 
 () () ()() ttt r t φθ φ φ −= −  .                        (5) 
 
Finally, by substituting equations (3) and (4) into the instantaneous direct utility function, we 
obtain the instantaneous indirect utility function defined conditional on the marginal utility of 
wealth 
 
  ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ( ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ( ), ( ), ( )), ( )) nn n vt vw t t Gt ucw t t Gt l lw t t Gt Gt φφ φ == − .  (6) 
 




                                                           
5 Note that the current value Hamiltonian implied by the consumer’s decision-problem can be written as (if the 
time-indicator is suppressed) 
  (,, ) uczG a φ ℑ= +  . 
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The production side is characterized by identical competitive firms producing a homogenous 
good under constant returns to scale. Given these assumptions, the number of firms is, itself, 
not important for the analysis and will be normalized to one. Output is produced by labor and 
capital. The production function is given by  ( ( ), ( )) f lt kt , and the firm obeys the following 
first order conditions at each instant; 
 
(, ) 0 l fl k w −=                        (7) 
(, ) 0 k fl k r −=.                        (8) 
 
2.3 The Government 
 
As mentioned above, the public good provided by the government is a state variable, and the 
accumulation of the public good will be described by the differential equation 
 
 () () () Gt gt Gt δ =−                          (9) 
 
where ( ) gt is the contribution to the public good at time t and δ  the rate of depreciation. 
 
Turning to the government budget constraint, note that the decision-variales facing the 
government are the income tax and the contribution to the public good at each instant. The 
stock of government bonds develops according to 
 
  () ()() () [ () () ]() n bt rtbt gt wt w t lt ρ =+ − −                    (10) 
 
in which ρ  is a fixed unit cost, measured in terms of private consumption, of providing the 
public good (i.e. the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the private 
consumption good). Normally, one would normalize this cost to one; however, I will denote it 
by ρ  here in order to keep track of its role in the welfare measures to be derived below. If we 
were to integrate equation (10) subject to an NPG condition implying that the present value of 
public wealth (i.e. the negative of b ) is nonnegative at the terminal point, we obtain the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government.   7
 
By combining equations (2), (10) and the zero profit condition, i.e.  ( , ) 0 flk w l r k −−= , we 
can derive the resource constraint 
 
 () (() , () ) () () kt flt kt ct gt ρ =− −                      (11) 
 
meaning that output is used for private consumption, private net investments and 
contributions to the public good (i.e. public investments). As the present paper focuses on 
issues other than depreciation of the physical capital stock, I abstract from such depreciation 
here. This simplification is not important for the qualitative results presented below. 
 
The decision-problem facing the government will be to choose the tax rate (or net wage rate) 
and contribution to the public good at each instant in order to maximize the present value of 





( ( ), ( ), ( ))
n
t
n wtg t Max v w t t G t e dt
θ φ
∞
− ∫ , 
 
subject to the state-equations (5), (9), (10) and (11) as well as subject to the static first order 
conditions characterizing the private sector, i.e. equations (3), (4), (7) and (8). The reason why 
equation (5) appears as a state-equation constraint in the government’s decision-problem is, of 
course, that the equation of motion for the private marginal utility of wealth is part of the 
necessary conditions for the consumer and, therefore, a constraint that the optimal tax and 
expenditure policy must fulfill. The resource allocation must also obey initial conditions for 
k  and b  as well as an NPG condition for b . As pointed out by Chamley (1985), the 
government does not face any explicit constraint on the initial marginal utility of wealth, 
(0) φ . 
 
The present value Hamiltonian associated with the public decision-problem can be written as 
(neglecting the time-indicator for notational convenience) 
 
 (, , )
t
pn p p p p Hv wG e k b G
θ φλ μ ν φ ψ
− =+ + + +                    (12) 
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in which the subindex “p” attached to the Hamiltonian and the costate variables denotes 
‘present value’. One may, therefore, interpret  p λ ,  p μ ,  p ν  and  p ψ , respectively, as the present 
value shadow price that the government attaches to the relevant state-variable (in this case, the 
stock of physical capital, the stock of government bonds, the private marginal utility of wealth 
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We shall return to the interpretation of some of these conditions below, when the model set 
out here is used for purposes of welfare measurement. 
 
2.4 Welfare Measurement in the Second Best Economy 
 
In this subsection, I will derive a welfare measure for the second best economy set out above 
and, in particular, analyze the welfare properties of the Hamiltonian underlying this resource 
allocation. To do this in the simplest way possible, I just assume that a unique solution to the 
government’s decision-problem exists
6. Therefore, let 
  { }
00
0 () , () n wtgt
∞
 
denote the optimal paths for the government’s control variables, where the superindex “0” is 
used to indicate ‘second best optimal resource allocation’, and let 
 
 




Vt v ws sGse d s
θ φ
∞
−− =∫                    (15) 
                                                           
6 For details regarding properties of the optimal solution, the reader is referred to Chamley (1985). 
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represent the associated optimal value function for the representative consumer at time t. As 
we are disregarding distributional concern in this section, equation (15) is also interpretable as 
a measure of social welfare. 
 
Let me begin by establishing a relationship between the optimal value function in equation 
(15) and the Hamiltonian underlying the government’s decision-problem. By totally 
differentiating the present value Hamiltonian in equation (12) with respect to time and using 









vw t t G t e
dt
θ θφ
− =− .                    (16) 
 
The intuition behind equation (16) is that the only non-autonomous time dependence of the 
optimal control problem facing the government originates from the utility discount factor. In 
other words, the effects of time via control, state and costate variables vanish as a 
consequence of optimization, which means that equation (16) follows directly from the 
dynamic Envelope Theorem. Therefore, by solving the differential equation (16) subject to 
the transversality condition
7  lim ( ) 0 tp Ht →∞ =  and then transforming the solution to current 
value (i.e. multiplying by 
t e
θ ), we obtain 
 
 
00 () () Vt Ht θ =                       (17) 
 
where (neglecting the time-indicator) 
 
0 0 0 0 00 00 00 0 0 (,,) n Hv w G k b G φλ μ ν φ ψ =+ + + +   
is the current value Hamiltonian evaluated at the second best optimum. This also means that 
the costate variables are measured in current value terms, i.e.  () ()
t
p tt e
θ λλ =  and similarly for 
the other costate variables. Equation (17) was originally derived by Aronsson (1998) in a 
slightly different model than the one used here and establishes a second best analogue to 
                                                           
7 This property of a well-behaved optimal control problem was derived by Michel (1982) for the situation where 
neither the instantaneous objective nor the instantaneous constraint functions depend explicitly on time  (as in 
our case). See also Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) for an extension of this result to a situation where the 
instantaneous objective function and the instantaneous constraint functions may depend explicitly on time. 
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Weitzman’s (1976) first best welfare measure. In summary, we have established the following 
result; 
 
Proposition 1. Within the given framework, and if the resource allocation is second best, then 
the current value Hamiltonian underlying the public decision-problem is proportional to the 
social welfare function. 
 
At the same time, although Proposition 1 establishes an analogue to Weitzman’s (1976) 
Hamiltonian-based welfare measure, it is important to observe that the proposition does not 
mean that the principles for measuring welfare in the first best and second best are equivalent. 
To see this more clearly, note that the costate variable μ  attached to the accumulation of 
government bonds is a measure of (the negative of) the marginal excess burden of taxation. In 
a first best resource allocation, μ  would be equal to zero (as the first best, in this case, 
necessitates lump-sum taxation in order to raise the appropriate amount of revenue to finance 
the contribution to the public good).  In addition, as a first best resource allocation would 
imply that the private marginal utility of wealth, φ , and the social value of capital, λ , are 
identical, one can show
8 that a first best resource allocation would also imply  0 ν = . 
Therefore, we have established the following corollary to Proposition 1; 
 
Corollary 1. In the special case where  () () 0 tt μ ν = =  and  () () tt φ λ =  for all t, in which the 
resource allocation is first best, the welfare measure in equation (17) reduces to read 
 
 
** * * * * * * () ( () , () , () ) () () () () Vt u ctztGt t kt t Gt θλ ψ =+ +    
 
where the superindex “*” is used to denote ‘first best’. 
 
The welfare measure in Corollary 1 is Weitzman’s (1976) welfare measure for the model set 
out here. As such, it can also be derived from a conventional social planner problem, in which 
the planner chooses private consumption, hours of work and contribution to the public good in 
order to maximize the consumer’s objective function, i.e.  (0) U  above, subject to the 
                                                           
8 To see this, note that as  (0) φ  is free in the public decision-problem, the optimal resource allocation must obey 
the initial transversality condition  (0) 0 ν = . Therefore, since  () 0 t μ =  and  () () tt φ λ =  for all t in the first 
best, we would also have  ()/ () 0 Ht t φ ∂ ∂=  for all t in the first best, in which case  () 0 t ν = .    11
equations of motion for k and G (as well as the appropriate initial conditions). Taken together, 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 show how the necessity to collect public revenue by 
distortionary taxation will affect the welfare measure. This is summarized as follows; 
 
Corollary 2. Within the given framework, the necessity to raise public revenue by means of 
distortionary taxes affects the welfare measure mainly by (i) adding the marginal excess 
burden times the change in the stock of government bonds to the conventional Hamiltonian-
based welfare measure and (ii) introducing a discrepancy between the private and social 
marginal value of capital. 
 
The first part of Corollary 2 is intuitive; as revenue collection is associated with a cost beyond 
the reduction in private consumption, this additional cost ought to affect the way in which 
welfare is measured. If  0 μ < , as one would normally expect, building up a stock of 
government bonds gives rise to a welfare cost in the sense that it necessitates more 
disortionary taxation in the future. To understand the second part of the corollary, note that 
the public decision-problem is formulated in terms of demand functions and an instantaneous 
indirect utility function, which are all defined conditional on the private marginal utility of 
wealth. If evaluated in the first best,  / 0 H φ ∂ ∂= as the private and social cost benefit rules 
for private consumption and hours of work, respectively, would coincide, whereas  / H φ ∂∂  is 
generally nonzero in the second best due to discrepancies between the private and social cost 
benefit rules. As a consequence, changes in φ  influences the social welfare via the private 
decision-variables in the second best, which is why the government (acting as a benevolent 
social planner) attaches a marginal value (positive or negative) to φ . 
 
Let me then turn to the measurement of value of an addition to the public good, i.e. the 
shadow price (or social value) of the public good in utility terms. To begin with, note from the 
final part of (14) that the equation of motion for the present value costate variable associated 
with the public good can be written as
9 
                                                           
9 Note that 
 
0
00 0 00 0 00 0
0
00 0
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00 0 0 0 0 () ( () , () , () ) () ()
t
pG p p tu c t z t G t e t t
θ ψ δψ
− =− −Δ +                    (18) 
 
in which 
0 () p t Δ  summarizes all indirect effects of G on the present value Hamiltonian that 
arise via the private consumption and hours of work, i.e. via equations (3) and (4). Solving the 
differential equation (18) subject to the transversality condition 
0 lim ( ) 0 tp t ψ →∞ =  and then 
transforming the solution to current value (multiplying by 
t e
θ ) gives 
 
 




tu c s z s G s s e d s
θδ ψ
∞






θ Δ= Δ . Note first that θ δ +  represents the discount rate used to calculate the 
present value of future marginal benefits of a contribution to the public good at time t. The 
intuition as to why the rate of depreciation of the public good ought to be added to the 
conventional utility discount rate is, of course, that the greater the depreciation, ceteris 
paribus, the less will be the effective size of past increments. Equation (19) means that the 
marginal value of an incremental public good at time t is equal to the present value of all 
future direct marginal benefits that this increment gives rise to for the consumer plus the 
present value of the indirect effects of the public good via the private consumption and hours 
of work. An important difference between the way in which the shadow price of the public 
good is measured in the second best and in the first best is that  0 Δ =  in the first best 
equilibrium. The intuition is that the indirect effects of G on the Hamiltonian, which are due 
to the effects of G on the conditional demand system given by equations (3) and (4), vanish in 
the first best as a consequence of optimization
10. In the second best, on the other hand, these 
indirect effects generally remain, meaning that  0 Δ ≠ . 
 
However, if G is additively separable from the other goods in the utility function in equation 
(1), meaning that G does not directly influence the conditional demand system given by 
                                                           
10 To see this,  recall once again that  () () 0 tt μ ν ==  and  () () tt φ λ =  in the first best, in which case one can 
show that 






Δ= − + − + =
∂∂
. 
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equations (3) and (4), the second best principle for measuring the shadow price of an 
incremental public good coincides with the corresponding principle that applies in the first 








tU G s e d s
θδ ψ
∞
−+ − => ∫ .                    (20) 
 
To be able to interpret the second best formula for public provision in a simple way, and since 
the social shadow price in the simplified case represented by equation (20) is unambiguously 
positive (as is the shadow price in the first best), I will throughout this section assume that 
0() t ψ  is unambiguously positive also in the general case represented by equation (19). This 
means that, if the second term on the right hand side contributes negatively to the shadow 
price, then this effect is not strong enough to dominate the positive direct effect. In this case, 
therefore, it is straight forward to interpret equation (19) as measuring the benefit side of an 
incremental public good. 
 
Now, to go further, let me examine the policy rule for incremental contributions to the public 
good. Since the public decision-problem analyzed here is a second best problem in which the 
revenue is raised by distortionary taxation, it is clear that an intertemporal analogue to the 
standard Samuelson condition
12 - equating the direct marginal benefit facing the consumer 
derived above with the direct marginal cost – does not in general apply. Part of the intuition 
behind the failure of the Samuelson condition was outlined elegantly by Pigou (1947)
13, even 
before the Samuelson condition as we know is was formulated. He wrote; 
 
                                                           
11 Note that if the utility function is additively separable in the public good, then the marginal utility of the public 
good does not depend on c and G. 
 
12 The Samuelson condition is often formulated such that the marginal rate of substitution between the public 
good and private consumption should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between the public good 
and the private consumption good. In the context of the model used here, an intertemporal analogue to the 
Samuelson condition can be written as 
00 0 ( ) ( )
0















13 Major early contributions to a more formalized theory of public good provision under linear taxation dates 
back to the early 1970s; see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern 
(1974). 
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“Where there is indirect damage, it ought to be added to the direct loss of satisfaction 
involved in the withdrawal of the marginal unit of resources by taxation, before this is 
balanced against the satisfaction yielded by the marginal expenditure. It follows that, in 
general, expenditures ought not to be carried so far as to make the real yield of the last unit of 
resources expended by the government equal to the real yield of the last unit left in the hand 
of the representative citizen” (1947, page 34). 
 
The first order condition for the instantaneous contribution to the public good in the present 
model accords well with this intuition, at least in the special case where the shadow price of 
the public good is given by equation (20). This is so because with a separable public good, in 
which case the shadow price of an incremental public good is measured in the same general 
way as it would have been in the first best, the second best assumption will only modify the 
way in which the social cost of raising the additional tax revenue ought to be measured. By 
using the second part of conditions (13), i.e.  ( )/ ( ) 0 p Ht g t ∂ ∂= , we can derive 
 
 
00 0 () [ () () ] tt t ψ λμ ρ =− .                      (21) 
 
The left hand side of equation (21) is the marginal benefit of an incremental public good, 
which was defined in equation (19) above, whereas the right hand side represents the marginal 
cost measured in terms of utility. The latter contains two parts; (i) the direct unit cost of 
providing the public good, ρ  (which is interpretable as the marginal rate of transformation 
between the public good and the private consumption good), and (ii) the multiplier λ μ −  
which is interpretable in terms of the marginal cost of public funds. If defined in utility terms, 
this incorporates both the shadow price of the resource constraint, here represented by λ , and 
the marginal excess burden, here represented by  μ − . If we follow the convention in the 
literature in defining the marginal cost of public funds in real terms by dividing the multiplier 
λ μ −  by the marginal utility of consumption,  () [ () () ] / () mt t t t λ μφ = − , equation (20) may be 
rewritten to read 
 
 
00 0 () () () tt m t ψ φρ = .                      (22) 
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Therefore, and in accordance with Sandmo (1998), we may alternatively think of the marginal 
cost of public funds as the multiplier,  ( ) mt , to be applied to the direct resource cost of 
providing the public good, ρ , in order to arrive at the socially relevant shadow price (in real 
terms) for the public sector. Equations (17) and (22) suggest the following result; 
 
Proposition 2. Within the given framework, and if the resource allocation is second best, the 
real accounting price of an addition to the public good at time t can be measured by the direct 
cost of providing the incremental public good, ρ , times the marginal cost of public funds, 
() mt .  
 
Proposition 2 closely resembles a result derived by Aronsson (2008); the difference is that he 
focused on the accounting price of a flow-variable public good, whereas the Proposition 
above analyzes the accounting price of a state-variable public good. In a second best economy 
as the one addressed here, one would normally expect that  ( ) 1 mt > , whereas  ( ) mt  would be 
equal to one in the first best. The latter follows because, in the first best, we have  ( ) 0 t μ =  
and ( ) ( ) tt λ φ =  for all t. One may then immediately infer the following corollary to 
Proposition 2; 
 
Corollary 3. In the special case where the resource allocation is first best, the appropriate 
real accounting price of an addition to the public good is given by ρ . 
 
As a consequence, if the first best accounting price were (erroneously) applied in a second 
best economy, and if the marginal cost of public funds is greater then one, we would 




The analysis has so far focused on a representative-agent economy. Such a framework is 
problematic for at least two reasons. First, it completely disregards redistribution, which is 
arguably one of the most important tasks of the public sector in most real world economies. 
As a consequence, it is important to address redistribution also in the context of social 
accounting. Second, there is no apparent reason as to why the public sector in the model set 
out above should use distortionary taxes, other than that we have assumed that it must do so.   16
In fact, as we avoided redistribution and informational asymmetries completely in the 
previous sections, it ought to have been possible for the government of the model-economy to 
finance the public expenditures by a lump-sum tax. I will return to the issue of tax instruments 
and informational constraints below by analyzing welfare measurement in a model where 
ability is private information. 
 
3.1 Briefly on Redistribution and Social Accounting 
 
Very few earlier studies have examined how redistribution ought to be treated in the context 
of social accounting. Aronsson and Löfgren (1999) analyzed redistribution in the context of a 
first best economy, in which the government chooses the consumption paths for two 
individuals (or families) with infinite time-horizons in order to maximize a general social 





( ( ( )), ( ( )))
t uct uct e d t
θ ω
∞
− ∫                     (23) 
 
subject to the aggregate resource constraint for the economy as a whole. In equation (23), the 
individual utility functions,  ()
i u ⋅ , have conventional properties (see above), whereas the 
aggregator function,  ( ) ω ⋅ , is assumed to be increasing in the individual instantaneous utilities 
and concave. Their results show that the current value Hamiltonian associated with this 
decision-problem, if evaluated in the first best, constitutes an exact welfare measure (in a way 
analogous to the representative agent models used in earlier work). Furthermore, since the 
first best resource allocation equalizes the social marginal utility of consumption across 
agents, the only measure of private consumption that enters the linearized current value 
Hamiltonian will be the aggregate private consumption (although the consumption level, 
itself, may differ across consumers). Therefore, an approximation of real comprehensive NNP 
derived by linearizing the current value Hamiltonian does not depend on the distribution of 
consumption in the first best. Relaxing the first best assumption, Aronsson and Löfgren 
(1999) also show that if the actual distribution is not the outcome of an optimal policy choice, 
then the current value Hamiltonian does no longer constitute an exact welfare indicator. In 
other words, a suboptimal distribution gives rise to additional terms in the welfare measure in 
a way similar to market failures; see also Chapter 1 of this volume.   17
 
Aronsson (2008) extends the analysis to a second best economy in which the consumer differ 
with regards to their initial endowments, and where the government raises revenue by means 
of linear income taxation. The resulting second best resource allocation does not, in general, 
equalize the social marginal utility of consumption among individuals. A linearization of the 
current value Hamiltonian then suggests that the information about private consumption that 
ought to be part of real comprehensive NNP does not only reflect the aggregate private 
consumption (broadly defined to reflect the instantaneous utility function) as it typically does 
in the first best; it also depends on the distribution of the relevant aspects of private 
consumption among individuals. The intuition – which may be understood in terms of 
equation (23) above - is that if the government is unable to equalize the social marginal utility 
of consumption among individuals (i.e. unable to fully implement its distributional 
objectives), then this policy-failure ought to reflect the way in which the welfare effects of 
private consumption are measured. This is precisely the reason for why information about the 
distribution of private consumption becomes part of the linearized current value Hamiltonian 
in that case. 
 
In the next subsection, I shall formally analyze the welfare measurement problem and – in 
particular the role public goods – in a second best economy with heterogeneous consumers. I 
will also discuss the role of redistribution more thoroughly. However, instead of using a 
model in which the government is restricted to using linear tax instruments, as in the previous 
section, I will consider a variant of the two-type optimal income tax model originally 
developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). To my knowledge, this model has not been 
used before in the context of social accounting. In such a framework, there are no restrictions 
on the set of policy instruments that necessitate using distortionary taxes for revenue 
collection and redistribution; instead, the use of distortionary taxes is, in this case, a 
consequence of optimization from the perspective of the government subject to the available 
information constraints. By comparison with the analysis carried out in the previous section, 
this extension also enables me to exemplify how the social value of an incremental public 
good depends on the tax instruments that the government has at its disposal. 
 
3.2 A Model with Two Ability-Types and Asymmetric Information 
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Consider an economy with two types of consumers; a low-ability type (denoted by superindex 
1) and a high-ability type (denoted by superindex 2). This distinction refers to productivity, 
meaning that the high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage rate than the low-ability 
type. The number of agents of each ability-type will be assumed to be fixed. Therefore, 
without any loss of generality, we normalize the number of agents of each ability-type to one 
at each point in time. 
 
Consumers and firms 
 
The consumers and firms behave in the same way as in Section 2. Ability-type i chooses 
his/her consumption of the private good, 
i c , and hours of work, 
i l , at each instant to 




( 0 ) ( () , () , () )
ii i t Uu c t z t G t e d t
θ
∞
− =∫ , 
subject to the asset accumulation equation 
 
 () () () (() () ) () () ( () () ) ()
ii i i i i i i at r t at r t at wt lt Twt lt ct =− Φ + − −   
 
as well as subject to an initial condition and an NPG condition for the asset. In the asset 
accumulation equation,  () T ⋅  refers to the labor income tax and  () Φ ⋅  to the capital income tax: 
both labor income and capital income are taxed according to nonlinear functions. The first 




c uczG φ −=                       (24) 
 (,,) [ 1 ' ( ) ]0
ii i i i i
z uczG w Tw l φ −+ − =                     (25) 
 [1 '( )]
ii i i rr a φθ φ φ −= − − Φ  .                    (26) 
 
Turning to the production sector, I will also here assume identical competitive firms 
producing a homogenous good under constant returns to scale, and I will normalize the 
number of firms to one. The production function is written 
12 ( ( ), ( ), ( )) f ltltk t, and the first 
order conditions characterizing the firm become (again neglecting the time indicator)   19
 
12 (, ,) 0 i
i
l fllk w −=  for i=1,2, and 




To avoid complications not essential for the results to be derived below, the social objective 




(0) ( ( ), ( ), )
ii t
i Uu c t z t G e d t
θ
∞
− =∑ ∫ .                    (28) 
 
As in other literature on the self-selection approach to optimal taxation, I assume that the 
government can observe income, although ability is private information. In addition, and also 
by analogy to earlier comparable literature, I assume that the government wants to redistribute 
from the high-ability to the low-ability type. Therefore, one would like to prevent the high-
ability type from mimicking the low-ability type in order to gain from redistribution. This can 
be accomplished by imposing a self-selection constraint, which means that the high-ability 
type must (weakly) prefer the allocation intended for him/her over the allocation intended for 
the low-ability type. To formalize this aspect of the public decision-problem in the simplest 
possible way, and to avoid that each agent reveals his/her true type at the outset of infinite 
planning period (after which the government would be able to implement nondistortionary 
lump-sum taxation), I reinterpret each agent-type in terms of a continuum of perfectly 
altruistic consumers and assume that the ability of the two consumers living at the same time 
cannot be identified ex-ante by the government.
14 
 
As a consequence, the self-selection constraint that may bind at time t becomes 
 
 
22 2 1 1 2 ˆ () ( () , () , () ) ( () , () () , () ) () ut u ctztG t u ctl t ltG t ut ϖ =≥ − =                 (29) 
 
                                                           
14 This simplification enables me to formulate the public decision-problem in a way similar to earlier literature 
on the self-selection approach to optimal income taxation in dynamic models; see, e.g., Brett (1997), Pirttilä and 
Tuomala (2001) and Aronsson et al. (2009). 
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where 
12 / ww ϖ =  is the wage ratio (relative wage rate), implying that 
1 l ϖ  is the hours of 
work that the mimicker must supply in order to reach the same income as the low-ability type. 
By using the first order conditions for the firm, it follows that the wage ratio can be written as 
a function of the hours of work by each ability-type and the capital stock, i.e. 
12 (, ,) llk ϖϖ = . 
The expression on the right hand side of the weak inequality is the utility of the mimicker, 
which is denoted by the hat. The mimicker enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability 
type, although the mimicker enjoys more leisure (as the mimicker is more productive than the 
low-ability type). 
 
The accumulation equation for the public good and the resource constraint take the same 
forms as in the model discussed in Section 2, i.e. 
 
 () () () Gt gt Gt δ =−                        (30) 
 
12 () ( () , () , () ) () ()
i
i kt fl t l t kt c t gt ρ =− − ∑  .                  (31) 
   
Before proceeding with the public decision-problem, two things are worth noticing. First, and 
by analogy to other literature on the self-selection approach to optimal labor income taxation, 
the labor income tax,  () T ⋅ , can be used to implement any desired combination of work hours 
and private consumption for each ability-type. The reader may, in this case, think about a 
labor income tax function with ability-type specific slopes and intercepts. Therefore, it is 
more convenient to use 
1 l , 
1 c , 
2 l  and 
2 c  as direct decision-variables for the government than 
controlling them indirectly via the parameters of the function  () T ⋅ . Second, as the government 
may transfer resources lump-sum over time via the tax system (recall that the general income 
tax functions have lump-sum components), we only need to consider one from the resource 
constraint and the government’s budget constraint
15. As I have chosen to use the resource 
constraint, this means that the costate variable associated with the resource constraint is 
interpretable in terms of the marginal cost of public funds. Therefore, and by contrast to the 
analysis carried out in Section 2, the second best problem is here formulated as a ‘command 
optimum’ problem, in which the social planner (or benevolent government) chooses quantities 
instead of tax rates. By comparing the first order conditions of this second best problem with 
                                                           
15 See Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001).   21
those characterizing the private sector (see above), one can derive the marginal income tax 
structure that ought to be used in order to implement the second best resource allocation. 
 
The second best resource allocation is derived by choosing 
1 l , 
1 c , 
2 l , 
2 c  and g  at each 
instant to maximize the social welfare function in equation (28) subject to equations (29), (30) 
and (31) as well as subject to initial and terminal conditions. The present value Hamiltonian is 
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and the present value Lagrangean becomes 
22 ˆ [] pp p LH uu η =+ −. Notice that although the 
Lagrangean contains the self-selection constraint, which the second best resource allocation 
must obey (according to the assumptions made above), the Hamiltonian takes the same 
general form as its first best counterpart. I will return to this discussion below, when the 
appropriate procedure for measuring welfare is analyzed. The first order conditions include 
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in which  ( , , )
ii i uu c z G = , and subindices attached to the instantaneous utility and production 
functions denote partial derivatives. Note also that 
12 (, ,) i
i
l wf l l k =  for i=1,2, and 
12 (, ,) k rf l l k = . 
 
Welfare Measurement and Public Good Provision 
 
The implications for optimal taxation (in a dynamic model) of a binding self-selection 
constraint have been discussed in other studies (e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001), and it would 
be beyond the purpose of this study to address implementation here. I will, instead, analyze 
the model from the point of view of welfare measurement. As in Section 2, the superindex “0” 
is used below to indicate the second best resource allocation. 
 
As the government faces a Utilitarian objective function by assumption, the optimal value 
function – the welfare function we are about to analyze – may be written as 
 
 
0, 0 , 0 , 0 0 ( ) () () ( () , () , () )
ii i s t
ii t
Vt V t u c sz sGs e d s
θ
∞
−− == ∑∑ ∫ .                (40) 
 
Now, by totally differentiating the Lagrangean with respect to time and using the first order 




,0 ,0 0 ()




u c tz tGte
dt
θ θ
− =− ∑ .                  (41) 
 
Solving the differential equation (41) subject to the transversality condition lim ( ) 0 tp Lt →∞ = , 
using that 
00 () () pp L tH t =  at the optimum and, finally, transforming the solution to current 
value (i.e. multiplying by 
t e
θ ), the welfare measure can be written in the now familiar way 
 
 
00 () () Vt Ht θ = .                      (42) 
 
Equation (42) is analogous to equation (17) and may be interpreted as follows; 
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Proposition 3. In a second best economy with heterogeneous consumers and a binding self-
selection constraint, the current value Hamiltonian underlying the public decision-problem is 
proportional to the social welfare function. 
 
It is interesting to compare Proposition 3 with Aronsson and Löfgren (1999), who derived a 
similar result in the context of a first best resource allocation: in an economy with 
heterogeneous consumers, they also found that the present value of social welfare is 
proportional to the current value Hamiltonian facing the social planner. Therefore, the basic 
intuition behind equation (42) is, of course, the same as that offered by them; the underlying 
decision-problem is time-autonomous (except for the direct dependence of time through the 
utility discount factor). At the same time, it is important to emphasize that equation (42) is not 
a first best welfare measure. This will become evident below, where equation (42) is used to 
address how the marginal value of the public good ought to be measured. 
 
To simplify the notations, let  , () ()/ ()
ii i
Gc G c MRS t u t u t =  and 
22 2
, ˆ ˆˆ () ()/ () Gc G c MRS t u t u t =  denote 
the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption for ability-
type i and the mimicker, respectively, at time t. One can then derive the following result with 
respect to the public good
16; 
 
Proposition 4.  If the income tax is optimally chosen, the marginal utility value of an 
incremental public good at time t can be written as 
 
 
0 0 ,0 0 2,0 1,0 2,0 ( )( )
,, , ˆ ˆ () { () () () () [ () () ] }
i st
Gc c Gc Gc
i t
t s MRS s s u s MRS s MRS s e ds
θδ ψ λη
∞
−+ − =+ − ∑ ∫ . 
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
By analogy to the corresponding shadow price derived in Section 2, note first that the 
appropriate rate to discount the future adjusted marginal benefits of an increment to the public 
good at time t - where the adjustment refers to the effects via the self-selection constraint - is 
                                                           
16 Public good provision in economies with nonlinear taxation has been addressed by, e.g.,  Christiansen (1981) 
and Boadway and Keen (1993). See also Pirtillä and Tuomala (2001) for an extension to a dynamic economy, in 
which the public good is a state variable. 
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given by the sum of the utility discount rate and the rate of depreciation of the public good. 
The first term on the right hand side of the formula in Proposition 4 reflects the sum of 
marginal rates of substitution between the public good and private consumption, i.e. the sum 
of the marginal willingness to pay by the consumers. Note that this sum is not only measured 
over consumers living at the same time; it is measured over time as well, since an increment 
to the public good at time t, ceteris paribus, will affect all future  ( ) Gs for  ( , ) st ∈∞  and, 
therefore, also the future instantaneous utilities. 
 
The second term on the right hand side is due to the self-selection constraint: it shows that a 
binding self-selection constraint at any future time affects the value that the government 
attaches to an increase in the contribution to the public good at time t. The intuition is that the 
public good constitutes an instrument by which the government can relax the self-selection 
constraint which, in turn, allows for more redistribution. How the government ought to 
modify its use of public provision due to the self-selection constraint depends, in turn, on how 
the marginal willingness to pay for the public good is related to the leisure choice
17. If leisure 
is substitutable for the public good in the sense that the low-ability type is willing to pay more 
at the margin for the public good than the mimicker, i.e. 
12
,, ˆ
Gc Gc MRS MRS > , increased public 
provision leads to a greater utility gain for the low-ability type than it does for the mimicker. 
In this case, therefore, the government may relax the self-selection constraint by increasing 
the contribution to the public good at time t, which means that the government attaches a 
higher marginal value to the public good than it would otherwise have done. If, on the other 
hand, leisure is complementary with the public good in the sense that the mimicker is willing 
to pay more at the margin for the public good than the low-ability type, so 
12
,, ˆ
Gc Gc MRS MRS < , 
the government may, instead, relax the self-selection constraint by lowering its contribution to 
the public good, in which case it attaches a lower marginal value to the public good than it 
would otherwise have done. Finally, in the special case where leisure is weakly separable 




Gc Gc MRS MRS =  for all t - the self-selection constraint would have no direct effect on 
the marginal value that the government attaches to the public good
18. 
                                                           
17 Recall that the only difference between the low-ability type and the mimicker is that the mimicker is more 
productive, and consumes more leisure, than the low-ability type. 
 
18 Note that, even if we were to add the assumption that leisure is weakly separable from the other goods in the 
utility function, a binding self-selection constraint will, nevertheless, indirectly affect the marginal value that the   25
 
However, although the marginal social value of the public good derived in Proposition 4 is 
measured in a different way than in the representative agent models analyzed in Section 2, the 
qualitative content of Proposition 2 applies here as well. This is seen from the first order 
condition for the contribution to the public good, i.e. equation (37), which implies 
00 () () tt ψ λρ =  for all t. In other words, the marginal social value of the public good reflects 
the product of the direct marginal cost of providing the public good and the marginal cost of 
public funds (here measured in utility terms). The difference between the model set out in this 
section and the model in Section 2 is, instead, that the marginal cost of public funds here 
reflects that revenue collection affects the self-selection constraint; not the necessity per se to 
use distortionary taxation as in Section 2. Note also that, in the special case when the self-
selection constraint does not bind (in any period), we obtain the first best resource allocation, 
where 
12 φ φλ == , implying that the marginal social value of the public good can be elicited 
by using an intertemporal analogue to the conventional Samuelson condition, i.e. 
0, 0 ( ) ( ) 0
, () () ()
is t
Gc i t sM R S se d s t
θδ φ φρ
∞ −+ − = ∑ ∫ . 
 
Briefly on Redistribution and Distributional Objectives 
 
The distribution of resources between the consumers is implicit in the welfare measure given 
by equation (42). Despite that the underlying resource allocation is optimal from the 
perspective of society, note that the government is not able to fully implement its 
distributional objectives. With the objective function set out above, the (benevolent) 
government would have liked to equalize the marginal utility of consumption between the two 
ability-types at each instant; however, concern for the self-selection constraint prevents it 
from doing so. An interesting question is whether this inability ought to affect the way in 
which the comprehensive NNP is measured. Following much of the earlier literature on social 
accounting
19, I will here define the comprehensive NNP by using the linearized current value 
Hamiltonian, and then use that the current value Hamiltonian can be written as the sum of the 
linearized current value Hamiltonian and the consumer surplus. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
government attaches to the public good, as a binding self-selection constraint means that the marginal utility of 
consumption differs between the consumers as well as differs from the shadow price of capital. 
 
19 An overview the literature is given by Aronsson et al. (2004). 
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Let (1 '( ))
ii i i
n ww T w l =−  denote the marginal wage rate of ability-type i, and denote the 
‘exchange value of leisure’ by 
ii i
n qw z = . In addition, and to simplify the notations even 
further, let  m φ ,  m c  and  m q  denote the average marginal utility of consumption, the average 
consumption and the average exchange value of leisure, respectively. Then, since 
[] c o v ( , ) mm Ec c c φ φφ =+  and  [ ] cov( , ) mm Eq q q φ φφ =+ , where  [ ] E ⋅  denotes the mean operator, 
and if we define the consumer surplus
20 as  [ ( , , ) ]
ii i i i i i
czG i su c z G u c u z u G =− − − ∑ , equation 
(42) may be rewritten as follows (suppressing the time indicator); 
 
 
0 0 00 00 , 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 0
,
0
[( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
ii
mc q G c i VC Q M R S G m k m G
s
θφ ζ ζ α ρ =+ + + + + +
+
∑  
        (43) 
 
in which I have used the short notations  /
ii
m α φφ =  and  / m m λ φ = , and where 
i
i Cc =∑ , 
i
i Qq =∑ , cov( , )/( ) cm m cc ζ φφ =  and  cov( , )/( ) qm m qq ζ φφ = . The first line on the right hand 
side of equation (43) is the linearized current value Hamiltonian, which is interpretable as the 
comprehensive NNP times the average marginal utility of consumption. The variables  c ζ  and 
q ζ  are distributional characteristics, and reflect the correlations between, on the one hand, the 
marginal utility of consumption and, on the other, the private consumption and exchange 
value of leisure, respectively. These distributional characteristics would be absent in the first 
best, in which case equation (43) reduces to read (as the first best implies 
12 φ φφ λ == =  and 
1 m = ) 
 
 
** * , * , * , * ** **
, []
ii i
Gc ii VCw l M R S G k G s θφ ρ =+ + + + + ∑∑   .                (44) 
 
Note that the comprehensive NNP on the right hand side of equation (44) only comprises 
aggregate variables. The essence is that equation (44) is derived in a situation where the 
marginal utility of consumption has become equalized across agents (meaning that 
0 cq ζ ζ == ), whereas equation (43) is based on a second best resource allocation with a 
                                                           
20 For a thorough analysis of the role of the consumer surplus in the context of welfare measurement, see Li and 
Löfgren (2002). 
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binding self-selection constraint, in which case the government is not able to equalize the 
marginal utility of consumption. 
 
A comparison between equations (43) and (44) suggests that, if the government is able to 
fully implement its distributional objectives – and given the form of the social welfare 
function assumed here – only the aggregate value of each private decision-variable (in this 
case the private consumption and leisure) ought to be part of comprehensive NNP. However, 
if the government is not able to fully implement its distributional objectives, then this policy 
failure ought to be recognized, which is why the ‘accounting prices’ for aggregate private 
consumption and the aggregate exchange value of leisure reflect distributional characteristics 




This chapter has analyzed some aspects of welfare measurement in a second best economy, 
where the public revenue is raised by distortionary taxation, and much attention has been paid 
to the treatment of a state-variable public good. I would like to emphasize two general 
conclusions from the analysis carried out above. First, a second best analogue to Weitzman’s 
(1976) Hamiltonian-based welfare measure contains information about the welfare cost of 
raising revenue. Second, the shadow price associated with an addition to the public good (i.e. 
the marginal benefit of an incremental public good) is, to some extent, model specific, and 
depends on the exact nature of the social decision-problem. This was exemplified by using 
two different models, i.e. an intertemporal representative agent model with linear taxation 
(where indirect effects of the public good affects the value attached to it by the government) 
and an intertemporal variant of the two-type optimal income tax model (in which the desire to 
relax the self-selection constraint affects the marginal value of the public good). In either 
case, however, an optimal choice from the perspective of the government implies that this 
shadow price is equal to the product of the direct cost of providing the public good and the 
marginal cost of public funds. In a sense, therefore, this product provides a static equivalent to 
the forward looking shadow price of a state-variable public good. 
 
It is not difficult to imagine several possible, and very interesting, directions for future 
research. One would be to extend the analysis to a global economy, in which individual 
countries engage in tax competition for mobile capital. Such an extension appears well   28
motivated due to the increased openness (and capital mobility) that has been observed during 
the latest 20 or 30 years. In addition, since many services typically provided by the public 
sector in real world economies have the character of private goods, another extension would 
be to analyze the role of public provision of private goods. Earlier research shows that such 
provision might be an important means of redistribution, which makes it relevant to address 
also in the context of welfare measurement. Finally, issues associated with the measurement 
of sustainable development have so far primarily been analyzed in an ‘Environmental 
Economics context’, which typically abstracts from other aspects of public policy. Yet 
another possible direction for future research is, therefore, to address the measurement of 
sustainability in an economy, where the public finance aspects addressed in this chapter are 




Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Note first that equation (39) can be written as 
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By using equations (34) and (36) to obtain 
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Solving equation (A2) subject to the transversality condition lim ( ) 0 tp t ψ →∞ =  and then 
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